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Abstract 
This article explores critical theory’s relations to German idealism by clarifying how 
Adorno’s thought relates to Hegel’s. Adorno’s apparently mixed responses to Hegel 
centre on the dialectic and actually form a coherent whole. In his Logic, Hegel 
outlines the dialectical process by which categories – fundamental forms of thought 
and reality – necessarily follow one another in three stages: abstraction, dialectic 
proper, and the speculative (famously simplified as ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis’). 
Adorno’s allegiance to Hegel’s dialectic emerges when he traces the dialectical 
process whereby enlightenment reverts to myth and human domination over nature 
reverts into our domination by nature. However, Adorno criticises Hegel’s dialectic as 
the ultimate form of ‘identity thinking’, subsuming unique, material objects under 
universal concepts by using dialectical reason to expand those concepts to cover 
objects utterly. These two responses cohere because Adorno shares Hegel’s view that 
dialectical contradictions require reconciliation, but differs from Hegel on the nature 
of reconciliation. For Hegel, reconciliation unites differences into a whole; for 
Adorno, reconciled differences co-exist as differences. Finally, against Habermas who 
holds that Adorno cannot consistently criticize the enlightenment practice of critique, 
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Adorno, Hegel, and Dialectic 
 
In this article I aim to shed light on the relations between German idealism and 
critical theory by providing a fresh interpretation of how Theodor Adorno’s thought 
relates to that of G. W. F. Hegel.1 The title of Adorno’s best-known work, the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, already bespeaks a substantial debt to Hegel, the 
philosopher of dialectic. Adorno and Horkheimer diagnose how the world-historical 
drive towards ‘enlightenment’ – increased use of reason to gain knowledge of nature 
and apply that knowledge for human benefit – repeatedly transforms into its 
opposites, myth and barbarism. This diagnosis of enlightenment’s failings reflects a 
broader approach: tracing how some phenomenon, concept, or institution turns of its 
own momentum into its contrary, thereby undergoing a ‘dialectic’. This approach 
derives from Hegel. In his Logic Hegel maintains that any concept or structure that is 
‘posited’ as independently subsisting necessarily undergoes a transformation into its 
opposite: this is the movement of dialectic. In his Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel 
describes the eighteenth-century intellectual movement of the Enlightenment as being 
subject to just such a dialectic whereby it transformed into its supposed opposite, 
‘faith’ (Glaube) (PhG 329-49/400-24; and see Bernstein, ‘Negative Dialectic as Fate’, 
22-23).2 Thus, in arguing that enlightenment reverts into myth, Adorno is informed by 
                                                
1 I thank the referees and editors for their suggestions for improving the earlier draft 
of this paper. 
2 For frequently quoted works I use these abbreviations. DA: Adorno, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment/Dialektik der Aufklärung; EL: Hegel, The Encyclopaedia 
Logic/Enzyklopädie I; ND: Adorno, Negative Dialectics/Negative Dialektik; PhG: 
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit/Phänomenologie des Geistes; WL: Hegel, Science of 
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Hegel. Admittedly, Adorno regards enlightenment as a world-historical process of 
which the eighteenth-century movement was only an advanced stage. Yet that 
suggests that Adorno is committed to viewing the whole course of history in 
dialectical terms, again following Hegel. 
 It appears that the form of critical theory championed by Adorno in the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment renews Hegel’s dialectic to address the political and 
cultural upheavals of the twentieth century. Yet in Negative Dialectics, Adorno 
criticises Hegel for being the arch-proponent of ‘identity-thinking’, whose 
metaphysical and ethical failing is to take thought and being to be identical. Hegel can 
only defend that metaphysical position by effecting a thorough-going subsumption of 
objects, in all their material reality and unique individuality, under universal concepts. 
According to Adorno, Hegel does this by developing his expanded form of reason – 
dialectical reason – which permits us to trace again and again how objects escape our 
concepts and then enlarge those concepts to subsume objects once more, ultimately 
covering everything in a complete system of thought. 3 Hegel’s categories may be 
                                                                                                                                      
Logic/Wissenschaft der Logik. For Hegel’s works I give either paragraph number 
(when available) followed after a comma by English pagination, or English 
pagination followed after a slash by German. Translations are occasionally amended 
without special notice. 
3 Adorno’s complaint that Hegel annexes what is other into thought into the self-same 
thinking subject has affinities with many later twentieth-century French critiques of 
Hegel – e.g. Derrida, Glas; Irigaray, ‘...the eternal irony of the community...’ in 
Speculum. Judith Butler defends Hegel against these kinds of critique by arguing that 
when the subject expands through the encounter with what it is other to it, that subject 
becomes other than it initially was (see Butler, Subjects of Desire). Presumably 
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mobile and expansive, but – Adorno objects – that is because Hegel aims to capture 
all that exists in the net of thought. Thus, for Adorno, it is through dialectic that Hegel 
purports to establish that thought and being are identical (as we shall see further in 
Section 3). After all, then, Adorno’s critical theory seems defined against Hegelian 
dialectic, condemned as manifesting the world-historical tendency for subjects – 
thinking beings whose thought is structured by concepts – to dominate objects – 
unique material existents – by categorizing and controlling them. 
 Adorno’s relation to Hegel is thus ambivalent: Adorno’s critique of 
enlightenment appears both Hegelian and anti-Hegelian, to rest on both acceptance 
and rejection of Hegelian dialectic.4 This ambivalence centres on the dialectic: it is 
dialectic that Adorno seems both to accept – in critiquing enlightenment – and to 
reject – in critiquing Hegel’s expansion of thought to cover objects comprehensively.5 
                                                                                                                                      
Adorno would reply that this becoming-other remains merely expansion for purpose 
of dominating the other. 
4 Alternative accounts of Adorno’s ambivalent relation to Hegel are given by 
Baumann, ‘Adorno, Hegel’; Bernstein, ‘Negative Dialectic as Fate’; Finlayson, 
‘Normativity and Metaphysics’; Macdonald, ‘“The Wounder will Heal”; O’Connor, 
‘Adorno’s Reconception’. 
5 Of course, Adorno engages critically with other dimensions of Hegel’s thought too, 
notably his view of world history as a necessary progression and his concept of spirit 
as a unity in which individual subjects participate. But those engagements can be seen 
as part and parcel of Adorno’s response to the dialectic – after all, Adorno criticises 
Hegel on these matters in his book Negative Dialectic, thus in the overarching context 
of re-thinking dialectic. What Adorno above all rejects in Hegel’s philosophy of 
history is his belief that the course of world history is progressive, against which 
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In fact, I will argue, Adorno’s response to the dialectic is coherent.6 Adorno regards 
Hegel’s dialectic as having positive and negative aspects, and he endeavours to 
extricate the positive aspects and forge his own philosophical approach from them.  
 Adorno’s relation to Hegel bears more broadly on the project of critical 
theory. Jürgen Habermas argues that Adorno cannot coherently criticize 
enlightenment and conceptual thinking for dominating objects while continuing the 
enlightenment practice of critical thinking in advancing this very critique. Pace 
Habermas, I will argue that Adorno can coherently criticize enlightenment critique by 
                                                                                                                                      
Adorno insists that every historical progression so far has engendered a concomitant 
regression – that is, that enlightenment has always been subject to dialectic. Thus 
dialectic remains central to Adorno’s response to Hegel on history. Regarding the 
concept of spirit, Adorno fears that it subordinates individuals to the whole at an 
intellectual level, prefiguring the totalitarian social trends of the twentieth century 
(see, e.g., ND 307-8/302-3). This fear stems from Adorno’s broader concern to rescue 
what is individual and unique from coverage by universal concepts, a concern that in 
turn reflects his critique of Hegel’s use of dialectic to subordinate the individual to the 
universal. So, again, Adorno’s critical engagement with Hegel on spirit ties back to 
the central issue of dialectic. 
6 Adorno might say that given an incoherent social world it is better to reflect those 
incoherences in thought than mask them with a falsely coherent system, as per his 
slogan ‘Wrong life cannot be lived rightly’ (Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im falschen) 
(Minima Moralia, 39). Yet to censure the modern social world for its incoherence – as 
wrong or false – Adorno must accept coherence as an ideal, which makes it an 
apposite standard for assessing his work.  
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virtue of the way that he reshapes Hegelian dialectic. Thus Adorno’s form of critical 
theory is not subject to the incoherence of which Habermas accuses it. 
 
1. Hegel: Dialectic as Ontology 
To reconstruct Adorno’s response to Hegel’s dialectic we first need to consider how 
Hegel understands dialectic. He defines it in his Encyclopaedia Logic (1817, revised 
1827, 1830) when explaining that his project in the Logic is to trace the complete set 
of basic categories or thought-determinations (Gedankenbestimmungen). Hegel 
understands these categories to organize both our experience and the world external to 
our minds. The categories are not only mental rules or ordering principles but also 
organizing principles that obtain in the world mind-independently and thus structure 
nature, history, and ultimately the totality of all that is.7 By calling the categories 
‘essentialities’ (Wesenheiten) Hegel indicates that they comprise the essential 
structure of things themselves (WL 28/1: 17). He also claims that 
thought, qua objective, is the inwardness of the world …. The meaning of 
thinking and of its determinations is more precisely expressed by the ancients 
when they say that nous governs the world, or by our own saying that there is 
reason in the world. (EL §24 A/56) 
                                                
7 In taking the categories to organise the world as well as our thought, I am opposing 
the influential ‘non-metaphysical’ line of recent Hegel interpretation, championed 
inter alia by Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, and Pinkard, Hegel’s Dialectic. With others 
who defend metaphysical interpretations (e.g. Beiser, German Idealism; Wartenberg, 
‘Hegel’s Idealism’), I believe that the non-metaphysical readings diverge unduly from 
the often metaphysical letter of Hegel’s texts, such as the passages that I quote here.  
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Elsewhere, too, he reiterates that the categories, or the ‘universality of things is not 
something subjective and belonging to us; it is, rather, the truth, objectivity, and 
actual being of the things themselves. It resembles the Platonic ideas … which exist in 
individual things as their substantial kinds’ (Gattungen) (Hegel, Philosophy of 
Nature, §246A, 1: 200). This overarching metaphysical commitment informs the 
detail of the categories that Hegel traces in his Logic. When he theorises causality, for 
instance, he treats it not only as a category by which we must order our experience but 
also as a principle bringing all mind-independent things into causal relations.8 
Dialectic governs the sequence of categories as Hegel traces it. As is well 
known, for Hegel, all categories follow one another according to a three-stage process 
of abstraction, dialectic, and the speculative (EL §79, 125) – famously caricatured as 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis.9 The second moment is dialectical in the proper or narrow 
sense: it is the moment of opposition, in which speech or reasoning (legein) is pulled 
between (dia- ) two directions. The presence of this dialectical moment in the whole 
                                                
8 Talk of a ‘mind-independent’ world simplifies, because for Hegel the world 
necessarily develops into and so cannot exist independently of mind. But, for Hegel, 
the world is not mind-dependent in the way that it is for Kant, for whom the 
(empirical) world receives its organizing structure from mind. For Hegel, the world 
has its own organizing structure, not imparted by mind; the tensions within that 
structure propel the world to develop, through the realm of nature, into mind. The 
world necessarily becomes mind, but it does not necessarily derive its structure from 
mind. Although simplified, then, talk of ‘mind-independence’ picks out this important 
difference between Hegel and Kant. 
9 The caricature goes back to Marx and his teacher Hans Chalybäus; see Gustav E. 
Mueller, ‘The Hegel Legend’, 304. 
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three-stage process of categorial development makes that process dialectical in the 
broader sense, that of being driven along by oppositions or tensions and their 
resolutions. By ‘Hegel’s dialectic’, I will (as most interpreters do) mean the 
dialectical process in this broad sense unless context points to its strict meaning. 
To elaborate on Hegel’s dialectic in this broad sense, I now want to read 
Hegel’s schematic characterisation of this three-stage process alongside the first 
three-stage process that he traces: the development being-nothingness-becoming, 
which opens both his Encyclopaedia Logic and his 1812-16 Science of Logic. Because 
this reading is preparatory for reconstructing Adorno’s response to the dialectic, I will 
purposely avoid making any innovative interpretive claims about Hegel, beyond the 
fact that I construe the dialectic as obtaining in mind-independent reality as well as 
thought. This aside, I will confine myself to distinguishing the three stages of the 
dialectic clearly, because their distinction is crucial to how Adorno refashions 
dialectic.  
Schematically, then, in abstraction or ‘understanding’ (Verstand) some category 
obtains – in our thinking and in the objective world – in ‘abstraction’ from whatever 
processes have generated it. Exemplifying this first stage, Hegel begins his logic with 
being (Sein). Being is the simplest and most inescapable category, necessarily 
presupposed in any thought or existence at all: anything that is must participate in 
being (EL §86, 136-39). 
 The second, strictly dialectical stage arises as the given category proves 
unstable and turns into its antithesis. Being is entirely indeterminate and featureless; it 
is, in fact, nothingness, Nichts (EL §87, 139; WL 82/1: 83). When thinking of being, 
we find that the category under which we are thinking is actually that of nothingness; 
everywhere in the world that the organizing principle of being obtains, actually what 
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is structuring entities is an empty, indeterminate nothingness. Yet nothingness, too, 
contradicts itself, turning back into being: both alike are featureless, indeterminate 
and empty, so nothingness is no different from being after all (WL 82/1: 83).  
 From this apparent stalemate Hegel extracts a positive implication: being and 
nothingness are distinct, because it is from opposite starting-points and in opposite 
directions that they prove the same. Nothingness turns into being, whereas being turns 
into nothingness: ‘the former is coming-to-be [Entstehen] and the latter is ceasing-to-
be [Vergehen]’ (WL 106/1: 112). Having thereby ascertained that being and 
nothingness are distinct (unterschieden), Hegel infers that they are also 
interdependent (inseparable, untrennbar), because each obtains only inasmuch as the 
other constantly turns into it (83/1: 83). 
 This combination of distinctness and interdependence makes both categories 
into aspects of a third, overarching structure. This structure is becoming (Werden), 
which consists of nothing more than the continual movement of being into 
nothingness and back (EL §88, 141). This provides resolution (Auflösung) because an 
overarching structure has emerged of which the first and second moments are reduced 
to partial elements (WL 105/1: 112). Whereas being and nothingness were self-
contradictory, the whole – becoming – to which they now belong is not: becoming 
does not immediately collapse back into either being or nothingness because it 
overarches and incorporates them both. Thus, we have reached (an instance of) the 
third, ‘speculative’ stage, which reconciles the first two categories with one another. 
  Now, for Hegel, it is vital that each resolving structure be nothing more than 
the combination into a unity of the two moments preceding it. This reflects a 
commitment to parsimony that organises all his transitions between categories. For 
Hegel, some category C counts as the necessary solution to the conflict between A 
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and B if C corrects A and B’s limitations while differing from A and B in content less 
than any other category (Forster, Hegel’s Idea, 186). That is, a category arises 
necessarily just in case it resolves the preceding conflict(s) as parsimoniously as 
possible. But why does Hegel so value parsimony?  
Each resolution that has arisen is only temporary, for problems arise in each 
third category. Precisely because each third category (e.g. becoming) unites its two 
predecessors, it differs from them as they were before they were combined into a 
unity. Just as reconciling, each reconciling structure differs from the elements that it 
reconciles. In this respect being and nothingness (for instance) remain partially 
outside the reconciling structure, and so their antagonism is not fully reconciled by it 
after all. This is why the solution to a conflict should differ from that conflict only so 
far as is required to resolve it and no more. Because even that difference may be 
enough to engender further problems, the ideal is to reduce the difference to a 
vanishingly small degree – hence Hegel’s commitment to parsimony. 
The logical process continues, then, as each third category turns into its 
opposite: it was supposed completely to resolve the pre-existing opposition, but it has 
left that opposition partly unresolved. Thus the dialectical moment (in the strict sense) 
recurs: having first become established in its own right, ‘abstractly’ (e.g. as 
becoming), the new category has now contradicted itself, ‘dialectically’. As Hegel 
puts it, becoming at first is merely the ‘one-sided immediate unity of these moments, 
[that] is determinate being’ (Dasein; WL 106/1: 113). That is, becoming is the unity 
and not also the difference of the moments, so that their difference falls outside 
becoming, such that it is not a complete unity after all. Another resolving category is 
required; that category in turn will, qua resolution, remain different from the conflicts 
that it resolves. And so on, through a whole chain of categories, until we reach the 
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final category, the absolute idea – itself nothing more than the whole of all the 
preceding links in the chain. 
 For Hegel, this chain of categories obtains in the world as well as in thought: 
he regards dialectic as an ontological process unfolding everywhere, so that the world 
is fundamentally structured both by contradictions and the rational process of 
overcoming them. That process does not eradicate contradictions but retains and 
neutralises them. For instance, becoming does not outright annul the contradictions 
internal to being and nothingness; rather, becoming is constituted as the overarching 
structure that it is by retaining and using those contradictions (for becoming is the 
dual movement in which being and nothingness self-contradict and become one 
another). The upshot is that contradictions are built into every level of reality for 
Hegel, each nested within a higher level that arises from the rational impulse to 
overcome contradictions yet contains contradictions in turn. 
 Is dialectic a method? Following Marx, many theorists have so treated it – as a 
method applicable to thinking about various matters, such as class antagonisms 
(Marx, ‘Postface’, 102-3). Yet Hegel claims that his only ‘method’ is to abstain from 
using any special methods and simply to follow, and reproduce in his own words, 
thought’s intrinsic movement. Knowledge, he says, ‘demands surrender to the life of 
the object, ... confronting and expressing its inner necessity’ (PhG 32/52). This 
reflects Hegel’s view that the world of objects is in itself structured by thought, which 
in turn might suggest that Hegel regards dialectic more as an ontological feature of 
the world than as a method. But how do we discern and describe reality’s 
developmental processes? Everything develops dialectically for Hegel, including 
human knowledge: we learn by framing concepts, following out and solving their 
contradictions, forging new concepts, identifying their problems, and so on. Just when 
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we think in this dialectical way, our thought comes to reproduce the dialectical 
structure of the world. So dialectic is not only a method, for Hegel, because dialectic 
also obtains ontologically – but, for that very reason, dialectical thinking is the right 
method for grasping reality, and thus dialectic is a method in part. 
 However, for Hegel, dialectical thinking is not just one possible method of 
inquiring amongst others. In thinking dialectically we simply follow the movement 
intrinsic to thought as it obtains in and outside the mind. We certainly do not apply 
the schema abstraction-dialectic-reconciliation, as a lifeless formula, to whatever 
subject-matter is at hand (PhG 29/48. Thus, attributing the schema thesis-antithesis-
synthesis to Hegel is a misleading caricature). Rather, when we immerse ourselves in 
our subject-matter and think its processes through, we find that the three-stage pattern 
recurs again and again, albeit under endless modifications and embedded in 
increasingly complex variations. We can then describe the pattern schematically – as 
Hegel does in the Encyclopaedia Logic – but the schema is the result of inquiry, not 
its presupposition (EL §83A, 133-4). 
 These views of Hegel’s – that reality is constituted by dialectical processes 
which rational thinking can comprehensively capture – will be criticised by Adorno. 
But first let us consider his positive response to Hegel’s dialectic. 
 
2. Dialectic of Enlightenment 
Adorno’s positive response to Hegel guides his (and Horkheimer’s) central 
contentions in the Dialectic of Enlightenment that ‘myth is already enlightenment; and 
enlightenment reverts to mythology’ (DA xvi/16). By ‘enlightenment’ (Aufklärung) 
Adorno means the world-historical process in which we have made ever-increasing 
use of conceptual understanding to gain knowledge about nature – both outer nature 
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(our physical environment) and inner nature (our make-up as human beings) – 
understanding applied with the aim of controlling nature to promote human well-
being. The more this enlightenment project is pursued, the more it engenders a 
regression into enlightenment’s opposite – myth, magical thinking and barbarism – 
epitomised by the rise of anti-Semitism under the National Socialists. Why does this 
regression happen? To re-examine this, we first need to reconstruct Adorno’s account 
of enlightenment, which he (and Horkheimer) present in a deliberately fragmentary 
manner. 
 Enlightenment is rooted in our desire to gain practical control over nature, 
including our own nature, for our own benefit: ‘The enlightenment has always aimed 
at … establishing humans as masters’ (DA 3-4/20). Initially, human beings sought 
this control from magic and myth – which, then, were actually the earliest stages of 
enlightenment. On the magical worldview, all nature was pervaded by spiritual 
power, mana (15/31). Mana was held to interconnect all things such that we could 
control one thing by controlling another in magical practice: say, manipulating a 
person by stealing and acting on a lock of their hair. In the first mythic worldview that 
succeeded magic in history, mana became differentiated and personalised, different 
places regulated by ‘local spirits and demons’ (8/24). Next these local deities were 
amalgamated to constitute ‘heaven and its hierarchy’, such as the ancient Greek 
pantheon. In both mythic stages, human beings tried to influence the divinities 
through sacrifices and rituals and to predict their actions through oracles and 
divination (49-50/67-8). Thus both magic and myth were early efforts to know and 
control nature. 
 Enlightenment progressed as people came to think that magic and, in turn, 
myth offered mere false beliefs about nature, not real insight into nature’s workings 
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(DA 14/30). In the name of magic and myth’s own motivations – to know and control 
nature – those belief-systems were rejected as false, ‘animistic’, ‘ensouling’ the world 
with (really non-existent) supernatural powers and agencies, imagined on the model 
of human life, thought or personality (5/21, 28/45). Condemning faith in gods for 
supernaturalism and anthropomorphism, humanity came instead to believe that 
universal forms or substances structure nature and permit it to be controlled – 
advancing from theology to metaphysics (5-6/21-2). Finally, coming to regard those 
forms as another residue of myth, humanity replaced them with numbers, reducing 
nature to quantities of moving matter or energy or force – the transition to modern 
science (7/24). Thus humanity has criticised and rejected each belief-system in turn 
for being mythical, anthropomorphic and not conferring real, practically useful 
knowledge. Extricating ourselves from each belief-system in turn, we have tried again 
and again to know nature as it really, objectively, is – culminating in modern 
mathematical science with the unprecedented power over nature that it affords (DA 
24-5/41-2). 
The more we have tried to distance our thinking from myth, the more we have 
fallen back into myth and magic. This is the consequence of a repeated fall back from 
attempted control over nature into control by nature. That fall in turn happens because 
the entire enlightenment project has been fuelled by our impulse towards self-
preservation (Selbsterhaltung), towards securing our subsistence and well-being – a 
natural impulse. The very impulse to dominate nature is a natural impulse, a 
ramification of our natural impulse towards self-preservation. So, in trying to 
understand and control nature, we are actually submitting unreflectively to our own 
natural urges, letting them control us. ‘Human history, the progressive mastery of 
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nature, continues the unconsciousness of nature, devouring and being devoured’ (ND 
355/348-9). 
Enlightenment reverts to myth because attempted human control over nature 
reverts to natural power over humanity. But what is the logical form of this dialectic 
of enlightenment? It shares the form of the dialectic that, for Hegel, afflicts being, 
which turns into nothingness just when it is posited in its own right. Likewise, it is 
precisely when enlightened thought tries to separate itself from myth, and when 
humanity thereby tries to separate itself from nature, that the dialectical moment 
occurs. When enlightened thought tries to posit itself in abstraction from myth, as 
something independent from and not contaminated by myth, just then this thought 
proves dependent on and mixed in with myth. We see this pattern in all the phases of 
enlightenment. For example, by adopting mythic worldviews, humankind aspired to 
gain real knowledge and control of nature; but precisely because humanity thought 
that its mythic belief-systems were free of magic, they overlooked the way that myth 
remained completely driven by human impulses and wishes, thus affording us only 
false beliefs pervaded by anthropomorphic fantasies and projections – just as magic 
did, into which myth had therefore relapsed. The same pattern has persisted right into 
techno-scientific modernity. Thus, there has been a repeated oscillation between the 
first and second stages of Hegel’s dialectic – the moments of abstraction, in which 
enlightenment tries to posit itself separately from myth and magic, and that of 
dialectic proper, in which myth and magic reassert their inextricability from 
enlightenment. 
It might be objected that rather than enlightenment and myth being related 
dialectically, their relation is chiasmatic, so that each continually turns into the other, 
the two lines of transformation traversing one another to form a cross. Such a view of 
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the enlightenment-myth relation is set out in Adorno’s 1932 essay ‘The Idea of 
Natural History’. Here he maintains not only that history is already nature but also, 
reciprocally, that nature is already history (‘Natural History’, 117), contrary to any 
belief in some essential core of nature persisting unchanged across history. One way 
that nature is already history is that nature has always been subjected to human 
thinking and practical activity, and thus involved in historical processes of 
transformation (processes of domination, Adorno suggests here, that have brought 
about nature’s destruction or ruination). So thorough-going is this involvement of 
history in nature that each natural object contains sedimented within it the history of 
humankind’s effects upon it. History is already nature, on the other hand, in a way 
that Dialectic of Enlightenment will reprise more clearly than this early essay: namely 
that history is the history of our efforts to dominate nature, yet where those efforts are 
driven all along by our natural impulses. 
In Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno maintains the cross-wise structure 
intimated in the earlier essay insofar as he claims that myth is already enlightenment 
(DA xvi/16). Myth and magic, as we’ve seen, are intrinsically systems of practice and 
belief through which humankind has sought to understand and control nature. Even 
though we have progressively distanced ourselves from these systems, that is because 
they failed to deliver what they promised: mastery of nature. Underlying this way that 
myth is already enlightenment is, again, the way that nature already impels us to seek 
to control it. Nature itself, in the guise of our inner impulses towards self-
preservation, drives the project of securing human mastery over nature. 
Yet enlightenment and myth, human history and nature, can be related 
chiasmatically and dialectically as well. As we have seen, the repeated reversion of 
enlightenment to myth exemplifies the movement in Hegel’s dialectic whereby that 
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which is posited abstractly undergoes a dialectical reversal into its opposite. It now 
transpires that the myth into which enlightenment reverts is not simply 
enlightenment’s opposite after all, for myth already is enlightenment in nuce. This 
recalls the point in Hegel’s being-nothingness-becoming dialectic when, being having 
proved entirely empty and so identical to nothingness, nothingness reciprocally 
proves identical to being because nothingness has no qualities other than those that 
already characterise being. Likewise, the very features that characterise myth – its 
provision of a primitive way of understanding and controlling nature – mark it as an 
early form of enlightenment. Myth and enlightenment pass reciprocally into one 
another, just as being and nothingness do. 
 Does the dialectic of enlightenment have any third, reconciling moment akin to 
Hegelian becoming? No reconciliation has yet occurred in history, but we can see in 
Adorno’s work the suggestion of a pathway along which humanity might accomplish 
such reconciliation (Versöhnung) for the first time. This pathway is implied by 
Adorno’s diagnosis of the dialectical relation between myth and enlightenment, a 
diagnosis that indicates an alternative possibility: ‘Through the decision in which 
spirit acknowledges itself to be domination and retreats into nature, it abandons the 
claim to domination which directly enslaves it to nature’ (DA 39-40/57). If spirit, i.e. 
human beings as enlightened thinkers, took this ‘decision’ (Bescheidung) to ‘retreat 
into nature’, they would be acknowledging that their thought depends on the natural 
impulses that fuel it. Adorno also calls this the ‘remembrance of nature in the subject’ 
(40/58). Remembering that it is all along naturally driven, thinking would also 
‘acknowledge itself to be domination’, because the impulses fuelling it have been 
impulses towards domination. In that case, by acknowledging the dependency of our 
patterns of thinking and activity on our natural impulses, we would be aware of those 
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impulses at work in and on us. We could then decide whether we wish to pursue these 
impulses or not, and if so in what ways. That is, our awareness of the ongoing force of 
our inner nature would open up the space in which we could exercise some freedom 
of choice with respect to that nature. Paradoxically, admitting our dependency on 
nature would enable us to realize, better than ever before, the enlightenment goal of 
winning freedom from natural impulses. Likewise in terms of knowledge, if we 
acknowledged that our thinking depends on nature, then we could reflect on how 
natural impulses are shaping our thought and potentially distorting it by leading us to 
view the world as we wish it to be rather than as it is. Again, admitting dependency on 
nature would allow us to attain greater objectivity than was possible when we sought 
to transcend nature.10  
Adorno’s anticipated form of reconciliation appears to have a Hegelian 
structure. The first term – enlightenment/reason – accepts its dependence on the 
second – natural impulse – and so, it seems, also succeeds in distinguishing itself 
from that second term. Analogously, Hegel maintains that being succeeds in 
becoming distinct from nothingness just in that being turns into nothingness along its 
particular direction – ceasing-to-be – and thus in that being is interdependent with 
nothingness, into which being continually passes. Interdependency makes distinctness 
possible. But for Hegel that interdependency makes being and nothingness joint 
aspects of one overarching structure, becoming. Adorno does not make the parallel 
claim that enlightenment and myth would be reconciled if they were united into an 
                                                
10 We might object to Adorno that if our thought is driven by nature to the extent that 
he claims, then surely what we need to acknowledge is that we cannot ever achieve 
either objectivity or the freedom to decide how to respond to our inner nature’s 
promptings. But that is an issue for another paper. 
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overarching whole. The reason is that, for Adorno, natural impulse does not depend 
on enlightened thought to the same level that enlightened thought depends on nature. 
Their dependency on one another is not symmetrical and equal as is that of being and 
nothingness for Hegel. We see the asymmetry in that enlightened thought is driven by 
natural impulse, and reverts into nature because nature was powering it all along, 
whereas natural impulse is already enlightenment in that all along nature drives the 
enlightenment endeavour. Nature is primary and generates enlightenment. Or, as 
Adorno puts it, the object has ‘primacy’ over thinking (Vorrang; ND 192/193). He 
explains this in his essay ‘Subject and Object’. Any thinking, reasoning subject is a 
particular object – a body, brain, and set of impulses – but not all objects are 
reasoning subjects. Thought depends on objectivity for its very existence: ‘concepts 
… are moments of the reality that requires their formation’ (11/23). Mind originates 
in the ‘real life process’, Adorno adds; consciousness is ‘a ramification of the energy 
of drives’ (198/265, 199/262). 
Adorno’s belief in the dependency of thought on nature is complicated by his 
further view that all objects do have an intelligible structure: definite properties or 
‘forms’ that we can identify under concepts. To this extent, he says that objects have a 
‘subjective’ element: a way that they are adapted to our understanding and so evince a 
kind of dependency on reason: ‘The general assurance that ... insights, cognitions are 
“merely subjective” ceases to convince as soon as subjectivity is grasped as the 
object’s form’, as it is by Hegel, he says (‘Subject and Object’, 504). We might think 
that Adorno cannot possibly be agreeing with Hegel here, since that would be 
tantamount to accepting Hegel’s equation of thought and being. Indeed, Adorno 
continues by saying that Hegel wrongly reduces the object to its subjectively 
intelligible form. But Adorno thereafter insists that the object is not absolute either; 
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rather, ‘the object ... is also nothing without the subject. If the object lacked the 
subject as a moment of itself, its objectivity would become a nonsense’ (509). Thus 
he does believe that that which is subjective is a moment or aspect of the object – a 
moment that makes the object something determinate (not nothing) that we can 
understand (rather than a non-sense). 
Thus, up to a point, Adorno agrees with Hegel that objects have intelligible 
forms. But Adorno thinks that as well as having such forms objects always have 
further elements that defy understanding: the sheer fact of their existence; their 
materiality in its thick, opaque presence; and the ways that, over and above whatever 
universal properties objects embody, they are each unique. Whereas Hegel believes 
that those further features can be reduced to thought-categories, Adorno considers 
these features irreducible (see Section 3). As a result nature, and what Adorno always 
aligns with nature, the object, necessarily exceed the subject’s thinking capacities. In 
sum, by virtue of their intelligible forms objects have a degree of subject-dependence 
– their primacy vis-à-vis the subject is dialectical, not absolute (‘Subject and Object’, 
505) – but, in contrast, thinking subjects are object-dependent through and through. If 
subjects were not also objects they could never think at all, nor would they have any 
motivations for doing so or for their thinking to assume any determinate shape. So 
dependent on nature are thinking subjects that the only level of freedom from nature 
they can ever win comes from, and indeed consists in, their admitting this 
dependency. 
Here Adorno’s difference from Hegel begins to emerge. For Hegel, all that 
exists is structured through-and-through by thought-forms; for Adorno, objects are 
only partly so structured and their intelligible side never exhausts them. 
Consequently, for Adorno, mind and nature depend on one another but not 
  
20 
reciprocally so; rather, nature and its material objectivity have primacy, so that we 
must acknowledge our dependency on nature to be reconciled with it. Adornian and 
Hegelian reconciliation thus differ. The difference is conveyed when Adorno states 
that reconciliation is ‘neither the undifferentiated unity of subject and object nor their 
hostile antithesis, but rather the communication of the different’ (‘Subject and 
Object’, 499). Reconciliation, as he envisages it (with Hegel), involves neither fusion 
of nor antagonism between the first two moments of the dialectical process. But 
contra Hegel, Adornian reconciliation holds together differences – of object from 
concept, nature from subject, myth from enlightenment – letting them remain 
different, juxtaposed as such, without subsuming them under any unifying structure. 
Difference persists when nature is admitted to extend beyond, have priority to, and 
generate thought, non-reciprocally. The only unifying structure that Adornian 
reconciliation adds to the differences is the acceptance of their difference as 
difference, nothing more. 
Still, Adorno’s conception of reconciliation remains partly Hegelian: Adorno 
too seeks for subject and object to be brought together non-antagonistically. But, 
against Hegel, Adorno thinks that that non-antagonism requires the admission of an 
asymmetrical dependency of subject on object, an asymmetry that prevents these two 
elements from forming a unitary whole. Thus their difference subsists as difference. 
In this very respect, though, we might after all see Adornian reconciliation as being 
even more Hegelian than Hegelian reconciliation. For Hegel, a successful 
reconciliation must differ from the opposed terms that it reconciles as little as 
possible, otherwise that attempted solution will after all fall outside what it aims to 
reconcile, generating further dialectical developments. Yet a reconciliation that 
merely combines opposed terms in their difference, as Adornian reconciliation does, 
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differs from those opposed terms more minimally than a Hegelian-style reconciliation 
which unites those terms under a third structure. Even when Adorno diverges from 
Hegel, then, there remains a Hegelian dimension to his divergence.  
 
3. Identity and Non-Identity Thinking 
Further reasons why Adorno diverges from Hegel on reconciliation emerge in 
Negative Dialectics of 1966, in which Adorno contends that the impulse to dominate 
the object is fundamental to Hegel’s dialectical logic. This contention is part of the 
broader critique of ‘identity-thinking’ that Adorno elaborates in this work. 
 Identity thinking is conceptual, classificatory thinking, with which humanity has 
endeavoured across history to gain real knowledge about things. The connection 
between conceptualisation and the project of knowing the world is shown, for 
instance, by Aristotle’s epistemology. For Aristotle, understanding is necessarily of 
universals grasped under concepts, not of particulars given to perception (Aristotle, 
Posterior Analytics, 42-43, 87b28-39). Yet universals only ever exist as instantiated 
in multiple particulars. Consequently, by knowing universals we do also know about 
particular things – but in respect of the universals that they embody as distinct from 
their sheer particularity. 
For Adorno, the activity of conceptualising universals and classifying objects 
under them constitutes identity-thinking. Concepts each apply to many different 
things, all those that instantiate the universal that a given concept picks out (e.g., the 
concept book applies to all those things of the type that book picks out). Hence, with 
each concept we classify the things to which it applies as instances of the 
corresponding universal (conceiving something to be a book, I treat it as an instance 
of this type). Conceptual thinking specifies ‘what something falls under, of which it is 
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an example’ (ND 149/152). When I conceive something as an instance of a kind, I 
treat it as ‘identical’ to all that kind’s other instances, for they are all its instances, 
exactly alike in this status. In classifying something I therefore gain no insight into 
what is unique about this thing, what distinguishes this book from all the others. Thus 
in conceptualizing things I also ‘identify’ them with the universal kinds to which they 
belong, and I lack insight into any respects in which things go beyond this identity. 
Adorno does not consider identity-thinking wholly misguided. As we saw 
earlier, he accepts that things come under concepts by embodying intelligible forms.11 
Yet identity thinking tells us not the whole truth about objects but only about their 
universal and intelligible side. Indeed, by giving us no way to appreciate or learn 
about the countervailing, unique side of things, identity thinking tends to disguise the 
very fact that things have that unique side. Identity thinking is partial, but it falsely 
presents itself as the whole. Above all, Adorno objects that identity thinking is 
inextricable from the world-historical project of controlling objects by 
conceptualizing them. This control is morally invidious domination (Beherrschung), 
in which we have forced other natural beings to deviate from their own intrinsic 
purposes and instead serve human purposes (Stone, ‘Adorno and Disenchantment’, 
233-4). Since we too are natural, we have also dominated ourselves: ultimately, we 
                                                
11 Here Adorno diverges from Nietzsche, contrary to Habermas’s claim that Adorno is 
very largely a Nietzscheian (Habermas, Philosophical Discourse, 121). Nietzsche 
maintains in his 1873 essay ‘On Truth and Lying in an Non-Moral Sense’ that all 
conceptualisation of things under universals is a fabrication enabling us to cope with a 
fundamentally chaotic world (see Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, 139-53). In contrast, 
for Adorno, classification enables practical mastery by giving knowledge of the 
intelligible forms that things really do embody. 
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have all become dominated by the instrumental rationality embodied in large-scale, 
bureaucratic organisations. Identity-thinking is implicated in the moral problems of 
these world-historical developments. 
One might object that this critique of identity-thinking cannot rightly apply to 
Hegel, for the whole point of his dialectic is to advance beyond identity-thinking or, 
in his parlance, beyond abstract understanding (Verstand). For Hegel, to employ 
understanding is to generalize across a range of particulars to form a concept of the 
universal features that they share (making Hegelian understanding very close to 
identity-thinking). Our concept of these universal features is ‘abstract’ in that it ‘holds 
fast’ to what the particulars share, in abstraction from (by ‘omitting’, weglassen) the 
respects in which the particulars each differ from one another (EL §163A1, 240; WL 
602/2: 275). In contrast, a ‘concrete universal’ differentiates itself into the various 
ways in which the particulars are particular. Hegel describes as follows the transition 
from abstract to concrete universal, in thought and reality alike. 
A universal can only exist by being instantiated in many particulars, always in a 
particular, distinctive way. Each thing’s particular way of embodying the universal 
necessarily goes beyond what is contained in the universal as that which all things of 
the kind share, whatever their particular ways of embodying it. The universal hereby 
undergoes a dialectic: the universal can obtain only if it is accompanied by and 
generates its ‘negation’ – the many ‘determinations of the concrete’ (WL 602/2: 275). 
However, just in this respect, the universal can be realized only by being dispersed 
into a range of unique particulars, so that these after all do not negate the universal but 
rather are the conditions of its realization: ‘it follows ... that the first negative, or the 
determination, is not a limitation for the universal which, on the contrary, maintains 
itself therein and is positively identical with itself’ (602/2: 276). For Hegel, the 
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universal is self-differentiating, existing only by being manifested or embodied in a 
plurality of ways. The new category crystallizing this resolution is individuality or 
singularity (Einzelheit): a thing’s particular way of instantiating a universal (indeed, 
ultimately a whole set of universals, differentiated from one another) is what makes 
that thing the singular individual that it is. The singular individual holds together the 
universal and the particular within itself. 
From Adorno’s perspective, Hegel’s dialectic universal-particular-singular does 
not challenge but defends identity-thinking, subsuming the particular under the 
universal with unprecedented thoroughness. For Hegel grasps that which is unique in 
things under the categories particularity and individuality – thereby classifying what 
is unique, assigning it its place in his ontology (ND 136/140). Particularity and 
individuality mark universal types that all things instantiate insofar as they have 
particular ways of embodying their (other) universal properties. So, just when things 
seemed to have particularities that escaped the universal, Hegel grasps those 
particularities as embodying further universals – particularity, individuality – which, 
woven into his sequence of all the categories, ensure that all that is embodies a 
universal. Adorno concludes that ‘as soon as we reflect upon the single … individual 
as an individual, in the form of a universal concept – as soon as we cease to mean 
only the present existence of this particular person [or thing] – we have already turned 
it into a universal’ (Adorno, ‘Subject and Object’, 498). Treating the individual qua 
individual as an instance of the universal type individuality, we forget that things are 
always more than mere embodiments of universals, even of individuality – which 
(assuming that such a universal exists) each thing must still exemplify in a unique 
way, thereby going beyond even that universal and remaining inexhaustibly singular. 
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For Adorno, Hegel’s reduction of the particular to one more universal reveals 
the dominating character of Hegelian dialectic. Hegel rightly sees that there is always 
more to objects than the universals that they embody. But in response Hegel expands 
the range and kind of universals that ontology recognises (by adding particularity and 
individuality; by recasting the universal as concrete and self-differentiating), so as to 
recapture this resistant element in things. Dialectic is his tool for effecting this 
expansion. The particularity of things outreaches the (abstract) universal and threatens 
to dissipate it (dialectically); yet, since the universal cannot exist without suffering 
this dispersal, the dispersal is necessary for the universal, thus its means of self-
realization (resolution). By tracing this dialectic, Hegel rethinks the universal in an 
enlarged sense, as self-differentiating into the whole range of universals including 
those of singular individuality and particularity. As Hegel puts it, his result is that the 
universal has grown to remain unchanging even in what seemed to be its antithesis: 
‘The universal, even when it posits itself in a determination, remains therein what it is 
... [and] continues itself through that process undisturbed and possesses the power of 
unchangeable, undying self-preservation [Selbsterhaltung]’ (WL 602/2: 276). 
In this light Adorno views Hegelian dialectic generally as a mechanism for 
expanding thought to cover objects. Each category encounters its limit; the paradigm 
of all such limits is the sheer uniqueness of things, which conceptual thought 
confronts as its antithesis. In response Hegelian thought grows, re-appropriating its 
antitheses by evolving into successive new categories that at last close up into a 
complete system, objects fully covered. This shows that what Adorno finds 
problematic in Hegel’s dialectic is – as we saw earlier apropos of the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment – the way that Hegel conceives the dialectic’s third, speculative 
moment. For Adorno, that third moment as Hegel conceives it is not genuinely 
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conciliatory but represents merely the first moment of the dialectic expanding to 
dominate the second – an ‘unrestrained expansion of the subject’ (Hegel: Three 
Studies, 5). 
Hegel would reply that no such restoration of the first term to power takes place 
here, but an achievement of interdependency between first and second terms. For 
Adorno, that reply has two problems. First, the dialectic’s first moments 
(enlightenment; the concept; the subject) are not really reciprocally interdependent 
with the second ones (myth; the object; nature) but fundamentally depend on those 
second moments, a dependency that needs to be acknowledged for any true 
reconciliation to be possible. By instead affirming interdependency Hegel disguises 
this radical dependency of conceptual on objective elements, according the first, 
conceptual terms more power than they really have. Second, Hegel believes that in 
their interdependency the two elements are united into a whole. But for Adorno this 
whole, just as a single whole, is at a structural level a version of the first term 
restored: the one restored to unity out of division. 
Is that last criticism fair? Perhaps not: after all, Hegel criticises each third 
moment (e.g. becoming as the unity of being and nothingness) where it excludes the 
difference between the elements that it unites; that exclusion propels further 
dialectical development. Thus Hegel appears to agree with Adorno that it is a problem 
for any third term to effect unity (and thus to be aligned with the first term against the 
second). However, for Hegel, this is a problem because it means that the reconciling 
moment is not sufficiently conciliatory: that moment does not yet include difference 
within it, so its unity fails to be complete because difference falls outside it. Complete 
unity therefore remains the goal of Hegelian dialectical development. Whereas for 
Hegel each third moment proves problematic because it is not unified enough, for 
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Adorno Hegel’s thirds are too unified, disguising the real asymmetry of concept and 
object (ND 158/160). One might respond that for Hegel, categories can only achieve 
complete unity by fully incorporating difference, so that ultimately the problem of 
imperfect resolutions is indeed (as for Adorno) that they are too unified and not 
sufficiently accommodating of difference. Yet, for Hegel, the reason why difference 
needs to be accommodated is so that genuine unity can at last be achieved, as the full 
incorporation of all differences. For Adorno, conversely, it is difference that we ought 
to liberate from unity at last. 
Yet Adorno considerably tempers even this critique of Hegel. To see this, 
consider his notion of the non-identical. Adorno wishes to avoid treating this as a 
concept of what all things have in common such that they are identical neither to one 
another nor to the kinds to which they belong. But the non-identical aspect of things is 
not something that we sense rather than grasp under concepts. Informed by Hegel’s 
critique of sense-certainty, Adorno insists that we have no immediate sensory access 
to anything: all perception is mediated (ND 186/187-8, 172/173), so thoroughly that 
we cannot even disentangle conceptual and perceptual contributions to experience. It 
seems that we can only access the non-identical aspect of things under the concept of 
the non-identical. We need this concept to enable us to recognize the non-identical – 
yet, somehow, we are to avoid doing so in a classifying, subsumptive way. 
Perhaps, then, the non-identical is a limit-concept, not giving us positive 
knowledge or classification of things but only indicating where conceptual knowledge 
runs up against its limit. The concept of the non-identical indicates that there is a side 
of things that our concepts cannot cover, about which we cannot know, just because 
this side is that in things of which all concepts fall short. The concept of the non-
identical does not constitute an attempt to bridge this gap, but merely conveys that the 
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gap is there. In this connection Adorno speaks positively of ‘Kant’s block’: Kant’s 
limit-concept of things-in-themselves (e.g. ND 386/378). This concept marks that 
there must be things-in-themselves otherwise there would be nothing to appear to us 
under our forms of representation, but that we cannot positively know anything about 
these things-in-themselves because we only know them under these forms of 
representation. 
Despite this enthusiasm for Kant’s block, Adorno also endorses (what he takes 
to be) Hegel’s rejoinder to Kant: that whenever we identify a limit to our knowledge, 
we already place ourselves beyond that limit just by identifying the limiting factor and 
so bringing it within our compass. Our supposed cognitive limits thus undergo a 
dialectic, turning into an absence of cognitive limits. This self-contradictory situation 
obliges us to move decisively beyond the limit by expanding our concepts to recover 
the object. Adorno follows Hegel here – surprisingly, since Hegel’s move appears to 
typify the dominating character of his dialectic. Nevertheless, following Hegel, 
Adorno maintains that whenever I grasp an object as non-identical with the concept(s) 
under which I have approached it, I become compelled to revise my concept(s) so as 
to try again to know, to classify, the elusive object. He articulates this movement in 
terms of ‘constellations’. 
Suppose that I try to know the book in front of me under the concept book (for 
Adorno’s points concern even the most mundane material objects). This tells me 
nothing about this particular book. So I generate further concepts: green-covered, 
paperback, dog-eared, annotated, etc. I try to grasp the object in its uniqueness by 
covering it with a range of concepts, where no two objects ever fall under quite the 
same range. (We open the concept onto the object by using a combination of 
numbers, not just one, Adorno writes; ND 163/166). Apparently, then, by amassing a 
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range of concepts around an object we can know it. ‘Constellations illuminate what is 
specific in the object, to which the classificatory procedure is indifferent’ (ND 
162/164). But how can a range of concepts afford us knowledge of what is specific to 
a thing? Surely such concepts only reveal the multiple universals that an object 
embodies, not the object’s unique way of embodying them – unless we reduce the 
latter to the unique range of universals embodied, in which case we would again, with 
Hegel, have reduced the non-identical to the identical. 
Strictly speaking, though, Adorno says only that constellations ‘illuminate what 
is specific in the object’ – where illumination is not necessarily full knowledge, and 
where what is illuminated is what is specific. What happens, for Adorno, in 
constructing a constellation is that we propose a succession of concepts each 
correcting something of what its predecessor(s) missed out (I improve on book by 
adding to it green-covered; on green-covered book – which still fails to differentiate 
this book from many others on the shelf – by adding paperback; and so on). But the 
series does not add up to complete knowledge of the object. The group of concepts 
only centre around (zentrieren um) the object, Adorno says – by implication forming 
a circle around it that, like planets orbiting the sun, never touch the object at their 
centre (ND 162/164). Even the total group of concepts cannot adequate to the object 
because its unique side lies beyond not only each single concept but also the whole 
group of concepts qua concepts. This transcendence of the object is what the limit-
concept of the non-identical picks out. 
Yet having marked that limit, we do not stop trying to know the object – contra 
Kant, Adorno says, who gave up on real knowledge too easily (ND 175/177). We 
keep adding to each constellation, enriching it, indefinitely. We keep pushing back the 
‘block’, the limit: it returns, but we keep trying to move beyond it, even as it moves 
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along with us. We become led into constructing new constellations around 
neighbouring objects with which our first object is entangled – ‘knowledge of the 
object in its constellation is cognition of the process stored in the object’ (163/166). 
For example, trying to specify what is unique about the book before me, I start to 
distinguish it from other books on the shelf by assigning each of them its properties, 
and so on endlessly.12 
Building up constellations is not just an endless, empty process: constellations 
do illuminate things. What they inform us about is the range of universals that an 
object embodies, thus about its intelligible, ‘subject-dependent’ side. This is only ever 
partial knowledge of the object, the unique side of which remains transcendent. But 
our acknowledgement of this motivates us to keep trying, and in so doing we increase 
our knowledge about the object’s universal side, thereby gaining knowledge. 
Although that knowledge always remains partial, within that partiality our knowledge 
of the object in its temporal and spatial connections with other objects can keep 
growing. Acknowledging our limits thus motivates rather than stymies knowledge-
acquisition. 
This way that the object always outstrips the subject (epistemologically) is the 
correlate of the asymmetrical dependency of the subject on the object (ontologically). 
Because objects precede and constitute subjects, objects always outreach the subject, 
comprising a background of which any subject is only ever a limited, and cognitively 
                                                
12 Adorno’s example is that we progress in knowing about capitalism not by defining 
it (as, say, ‘a system of production for profit’) but by building up a set of concepts 
capturing the elements that have coalesced historically to compose this system: free 
labour, the separation of households from workplaces, accounting, a rationalistic legal 
system, etc. (ND 166/168). 
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limited, part. Thus Adorno rejects Hegel’s view that we can exhaustively know 
objects under the entire system of concepts. Adorno’s disagreement with Hegel here 
is consistent both with Adorno thinking dialectically – when he shows how each 
concept, in turn, proves limited – and even, to an extent, with Adorno thinking 
‘rationally’ in the Hegelian sense of moving beyond any limit towards a greater whole 
(see O’Connor, ‘Adorno’s Reconception’, 540). After all, Adorno agrees with Hegel 
that we always move beyond each of our limits in turn and do so by grouping 
concepts together, building constellations that become more and more interrelated and 
therefore yield greater knowledge of objects. Grow as it might, though, that 
knowledge only ever remains partial, continuing to be limited by the non-identical. 
 
4. The Coherence of Adorno’s Critical Theory 
The viability of Adorno’s critical theory is challenged by Habermas, whose challenge 
motivates his turn to ‘second-generation’ critical theory. Habermas objects that when 
Adorno criticises rational thought as a whole (as Adorno does: ‘to think is to 
identify’; ND 5/17) as an instrument of the subject’s domination over the object, 
Adorno invalidates the rational thought with which he makes this critique (Habermas, 
Philosophical Discourse, 119-20). Adorno’s position undermines itself, Habermas 
concludes (127-9). To escape the same contradiction, Habermas founds his successor 
form of critical theory on the distinction between two forms of reason: 
communicative, intersubjective (or subject-subject) reason, oriented towards free 
agreement amongst rational agents; and subject-object reason, oriented to knowledge 
and practical control of objects (295-6). By wrongly equating the latter with reason as 
a whole, Habermas thinks, Adorno overlooks the communicative form of reason that 
provides a basis for consistent social critique that does not undermine itself. 
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 On my interpretation, Adorno’s assessment of enlightenment and conceptual 
thought is less negative than Habermas maintains. Certainly, for Adorno, conceptual 
thought has always served the domination of nature. In that service, humanity has 
repeatedly criticised its own earlier forms of thought for being merely mythic or 
magical, therefore not providing the real knowledge that enables domination. In 
criticizing its earlier stages on these grounds, enlightened thought has repeatedly 
advanced the goals of freedom, reason, and knowledge – freedom from the distorting 
influence of natural impulses and from anthropomorphic projections; the ability to 
think rationally, free of such influences; knowledge of objects and the world as they 
really are. Thus: ‘Every progress made by civilization has, along with domination, 
also renewed the prospect of its pacification’, i.e. of the pacification of domination 
(DA 40/57). From its outset, enlightenment, and conceptual thought with it, have been 
ambiguous. Negatively, they have pursued domination; but positively, they have 
pursued criticism, reason, freedom, and knowledge. 
 So can Adorno criticize the negative side of enlightenment in light of its 
positive side? Perhaps not, for on Adorno’s own account those positive values of 
reason, freedom, and knowledge have always been compromised, contaminated by 
the goal of domination with which they have been interwoven all along. However, 
that compromising affliction – the dialectic of enlightenment – could be removed if 
we pursued these enlightenment values in a new form that reconciled them with 
nature – reconciled in Adorno’s not-fully-Hegelian sense. ‘By virtue of this 
remembrance of nature in the subject, in whose fulfilment the unrecognized truth of 
all culture lies hidden, enlightenment is altogether opposed to domination’ (DA 
40/58), Adorno declares – thereby indicating both his ongoing commitment to 
enlightenment and his view that reconciliation with nature offers the solution to the 
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problems of all culture so far. Were we to acknowledge our dependency on nature, 
then, we would realize that we can never totally control nature: we are of nature in the 
first place, so it is not rational to pursue such control. Indeed, such total control would 
– irrationally – entail total repression of our own instincts, although these motivate us 
to pursue control in the first place. The story of Odysseus and the sirens dramatises 
this. Odysseus can resist the sirens only by blocking off his senses, being chained, 
immobilised, to his ship’s mast: he masters outer nature only by stifling his inner 
nature utterly. Admittedly, as natural beings, we cannot entirely escape our own urge 
to dominate nature. But this urge could be reconciled with the fact that total 
domination is irrational and undesirable if, recognizing that fact, we aimed to control 
nature only partially, not totally. Likewise we could gain greater freedom, critical 
capacity, and knowledge than we have attained hitherto if we admitted that these 
goals are only ever partially realizable, limited by a dependence on nature that we can 
never get around.  
 This conception of reconciliation as ‘communication between the different’, 
which (as we have seen) is shaped by Adorno’s response to Hegel, permits Adorno to 
criticize enlightenment reason using enlightenment reason without invalidating his 
critique in the process. For he criticises enlightenment’s historically existing and self-
undermining, self-contradictory forms from the standpoint of an ideal, non-
contradictory form of enlightenment reason that no society has yet realized – but that 
he can anticipate because the problems point forward to their solution. The fact that 
enlightenment has foundered throughout history because of its efforts to detach itself 
from nature indicates the needed solution: acknowledgement of our dependency on 
nature. Then enlightenment ‘comes into its own only when it ... dares to sublate 
[aufzuheben] ... the principle of blind domination’ (DA 42/59). That reconciled form 
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of reason may criticize dialectical, historically existing reason because it corrects the 
problems with the latter. Equally, because reconciled reason is just the reconciled 
form of the same reason that is criticised – is nothing more than that same reason in 
reconciled form – the criticism is reason’s self-criticism. 
 To say that the problems of enlightenment point forward to their solution is not 
to say that that solution must inevitably be realized – a model of inevitable historical 
progression that Adorno connects with Hegel. Against that model, Adorno firstly 
suggests that spirit would have to decide to acknowledge its hitherto dominating 
character and to reconcile itself with nature. Yet in much of his work Adorno doubts 
that twentieth-century humanity is capable of making that decision, so thoroughly 
have the machineries of modern bureaucracy and instrumental reason crushed our 
capacities for free decision-making. This seems to leave us at an impasse in which a 
decision is needed yet cannot be made. A more optimistic reading of Adorno is 
possible, though, in which he deliberately highlights, even exaggerates, negative 
tendencies within modernity in order to alert us to the threats that human freedom 
faces (for this reading see Cook, Adorno, Habermas, 172-4). On that reading, 
Adorno’s position is not that our capacities for free choice have been altogether 
crushed but that they may yet become crushed if we do not heed the danger and act to 
avert it. 
 Second, again departing from Hegel’s picture of historical progression, Adorno 
thinks that what is needed is for us to effect a decisive reorientation of history as it 
has unfolded so far: insofar as there has been a continuous history running from the 
slingshot to the megaton bomb, we need to break out of that entire course (ND 
320/314). For Hegel, in contrast, historical progression has one single goal animating 
it throughout – the realisation of universal human freedom – so that each historical 
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step forward is a step forward on the same course. But as Adorno sees it, to take 
another step forward on the same course that history has run so far would be to 
continue the effort of enlightenment to posit itself as separate from nature, which 
would merely incur another dialectical fall back into nature. Instead we need to 
reorientate enlightenment completely so that it is reconciled with nature. Even though 
this would be a complete reorientation, it is one towards which the dialectic of 
enlightenment points, as the solution that that dialectic necessarily requires. Once 
again, then, there remains a Hegelian element even to the way that Adorno departs 
from Hegel. 
 For Adorno, one single form of reason, subject-object reason, has propelled 
human history along its troubled course. Yet the dialectic to which this form of reason 
succumbs shows that reason must assume a reconciled form, from the standpoint of 
which reason can criticize its own hitherto defective forms and their oppressive 
societal expressions. Contrary to Habermas, social critique can be coherently 
grounded in subject-object reason because subject-object reason inherently has a 
dialectical structure that points it to develop beyond its so far problematic forms. This 
coherence in Adorno’s approach to reason derives from the way in which he reshapes 
Hegelian dialectic, reconceiving the nature of the reconciliation that is the goal of the 
dialectical and historical process. In this reconception reconciliation is not the unity of 
reason and nature, but their co-existence in difference, a state in which human reason 
acknowledges that nature will always outstrip it. 
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